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What’s Really at Steak: How Conflicts of
Interest Within the FDA and USDA Fail to
Protect Consumers
CHRISTINE BEADERSTADT*
In 2015, Chipotle shut down all of its restaurants nationwide in response to the ongoing food poisoning outbreaks. The deadly pathogen e.
coli sickened people from the East coast to the West, and cost taxpayers
hundreds of thousands of dollars. This Comment explores how these pathogenic outbreaks continue to happen, despite having federal agencies that
are tasked with outbreak prevention.
The increase of pathogenic outbreaks like e. coli and salmonella
correlates to looser enforcement of federal regulations by executive agencies like the FDA and USDA. These agencies are often staffed by former
lobbyists of the meat and poultry industries, and some who are even particularly high-level appointees who had contributed heavily to political campaigns of members of Congress. With former lobbyists within the ranks of
government officials, the FDA and USDA have failed to uphold what they
are mandated to do: protect the American people from harmful investigation of bacteria in our food.
This Comment calls for a shut down of the “revolving door” by
proposing stricter enforcement of restrictions on former executive branch
employees from lobbying, as well as establishing limitations on meat industry lobbyists from serving in executive food protection agencies.

*

Christine Beaderstadt is a second year Juris Doctor Candidate at Northern Illinois University College
of Law. She thanks her family, editors, staff, and professors for their invaluable guidance. No one is an
island, and this work would not be what it is without them. Any mistakes are her own.
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Picture this: it is lunchtime and you are hungry. You walk into a restaurant, order your hamburger and fries, eat, then go home. A few days
later, you get flu-like symptoms.1 You do not get better, in fact, you get
worse. Eventually you are hospitalized, at first for just a few days, then for
weeks. You may recover, or you may not.2
This illness struck six people in September 2015 at a burger restaurant
in Vermont.3 The restaurant was shut down, and e. coli O157:H74 was
1. Symptoms of E. Coli Infection, ABOUT E. COLI, http://www.aboutecoli.com/ecoli_symptoms_risks#.Vwpj1sfZqf4 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). Marler and his
firm specialize in food safety litigation; see Wil S. Hylton, A Bug In the System: Why Last
Night’s Chicken Made You Sick, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/02/bug-system.
2. Symptoms of E. Coli Infection, supra note 1.
3. Lydia Zuraw, Update: Six Vermont E. Coli Cases Being Linked to Undercooked
Ground
Beef,
FOOD
SAFETY
NEWS
(Sept.
30,
2015),
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found in the ground beef being prepared and served.5 Another outbreak
occurred two months later, across the country in Washington and Oregon,
at a Chipotle Mexican Grill where fifty people were affected.6 In 2015, a
total of forty-three Chipotle restaurants took precautionary measures and
voluntarily shut down due to the threat of food contamination.7
Unfortunately, this was not the first time a food borne illness in meat
led to hospitalizations and fatalities.8 In December 1992, a meat contamination at a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant in Washington State killed four children
and sickened 600 people.9 Meat contamination happened again, in 2006, at
a dinner gathering in Minnesota.10 Two years later, in Virginia, twenty-five
Boy Scouts fell ill while at camp.11
In September 2015, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), a
division of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), issued an

http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/09/5-people-sickened-with-e-coli-invermont/#.VhrP6LzZqf4.
4. [Hereinafter e.coli]. This paper does not distinguish between varying strains of
e.coli, for example e.coli O157:H7 or e. coli 026.
5. Zuraw, supra note 3. E. coli and salmonella contamination is not specific to just
meat, and contamination has been found in fruits and vegetables. However, the bacteria
contamination comes from animals and their waste, and later spreads to produce from unsanitary supply chain transportation or in grocery stores during the stocking process.
6. Multistate Outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O26 Infections
Linked to Chipotle Mexican Grill Restaurants, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Dec. 4, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2015/o26-11-15/index.html.
7. Food Safety Update and FAQ, CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL (Dec. 21, 2015, 3:30
PM), https://www.chipotle.com/update. In February 2016, Chipotle instituted a nationwide
shut down for a single day for a “collective check-in.” See, e.g., Jacob Brogan, Every
Chipotle Location Is Shutting Down for One Day, SLATE.COM (Jan. 15, 2016, 11:13 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/01/15/chipotle_closing_all_restaurants_in_feb_
after_health_crisis.html.
8. Maureen O’Hagan, What You Eat Can Kill You If You Don’t Watch Out, THE
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 29, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nwmagazine/what-you-eat-can-kill-you-if-you-dont-watch-out/. Numbers of exactly how many
people were sickened varies between 500-600; see also Marler Clark Law Firm, Jack in the
Box E. coli Outbreak Lawsuits - Western States (1993), MARLER CLARK.COM,
http://www.marlerclark.com/case_news/view/jack-in-the-box-e-coli-outbreak-western-states
(last visited Apr. 10, 2016), which states that 602 people were sickened.
9. Id. As Representative Hall of Ohio implored, “This is not the time . . . to be
weakening food inspection, especially inspection of safe meat.” 141 CONG. REC. H7017
(daily ed. July 17, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hall).
10. Marler Clark Law Firm, Nebraska Beef E. coli O157:H7 Outbreak 2006, ABOUT
E. COLI, http://www.about-ecoli.com/ecoli_outbreaks/view/nebraska-beef-e-coli-o157h7outbreak/#.VhrXj7zZqf4 [hereinafter Nebraska Beef] (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
11. Marler Clark Law Firm, S & S Foods - Boy Scout Camp E. coli Outbreak,
ABOUT E. COLI, http://www.about-ecoli.com/ecoli_outbreaks/view/s-s-foods-goshen-boyscout-camp-e-coli-outbreak/#.VhrPE7zZqf4 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
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alert regarding packaged chicken linked with salmonella.12 The USDA issued a study that estimated 24% of all chicken parts had salmonella.13
Government regulatory agencies like FSIS and the USDA are established to protect the American people from food borne illnesses and contaminations, but current measures are ineffective as shown by continual
public illness outbreaks.14 After peeling back the curtain behind these two
agencies, namely the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the USDA,
I found the agencies to be staffed with individuals who have a conflict of
interest.15 Specifically, the very individuals in governmental agencies who
are tasked with meat inspections have close and significant ties to meat
lobbyists and the meat industry. These ties are contrary to public health
safety and concerns.16
It is no secret that conflicts of interest are riddled throughout the government, including the FDA and USDA.17 There are significant overlaps
and close contacts between food lobbyists, those in support of meat processing industries, and elected or appointed officials in government positions in charge of oversight and regulation.18 These conflicts of interest are
impacting the health and well-being of the American people, sometimes
fatally.19 As Michele Simon states in her book, Appetite for Profit, which
12. Gabrielle N. Johnston, FSIS Issues Public Health Alert For Stuffed Chicken
Products Due To Possible Salmonella Contamination, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
AGRIC.
(Sept.
17,
2015),
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/newsroom/news-releases-statementstranscripts/news-release-archives-by-year/archive/2015/pha-091715.
13. Hylton, supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., Zuraw, supra note 3.
15. See, e.g., Revolving Door: Search Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/search_result.php?agency=Dept+of+Agriculture&id
=EAAGR (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Revolving Door: Search Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture, supra note 18.
18. Id. See also Lloyd Hitoshi Maye, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So
Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 520 (2008), in which Maye argues that the
focus on government actors may also be explained by the fact
that government actors are usually not institutionally constrained from influencing their subset of government actions.
For example, members of Congress, if they choose, can have
significant influence on executive branch agency actions.
There is still an unresolved scholarly debate over whether such
influence occurs only rarely – in response to clear agency
overreaching – or is a constant and significant part of each
agency’s environment.
Id.
19. O’Hagan, supra note 8; Nebraska Beef, supra note 10.
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analyzes the connection between “Big Food”20 industry and government
regulation of food, “[a] food lobbyist’s main goal is to provide any distraction, misdirection, or obfuscation possible to avoid talking about corporate
accountability.”21
With this in mind, how is it permitted that former government officials
once charged with implementing food safety regulations become employees
and advocates of meat companies that support looser food safety regulations and policies? Because the “revolving door” between government and
private employment is not uncommon, the interests of the individual employee and the meat lobbying association are now economically tied and
the safety role of the FDA and USDA is weakened. This Comment examines two main ideas: first, the relationship between former employees within the meat industry who now serve on government oversight agencies such
as the FDA and USDA, and the reverse of this, former FDA and USDA
employees and their subsequent ties to big meat lobbying organizations.
These conflicts of interest arise when individuals work for a lobbying firm,
and then later serve on the FDA or USDA. The mission of agencies like the
FDA or USDA is often in opposition to the interests of that lobbying firm in
which the employee had previously worked. These conflicts of interest potentially weaken the safety standards established to protect the American
people from contamination as the employee may later return to the meat
industry following his appointment or governmental employment.
Second, this Comment will discuss several laws that try to prohibit
conflicts of interest, and legislative attempts to close the revolving door
between agency officials and employees of the meat industry. Later, this
Comment explores how legislative enactments are, in actuality, ineffectual
and allow the loopholes in the conflict of interest laws to perpetuate. The
gray areas surrounding conflicts of interest permit former government employees to take advantage of loopholes and semantics.22 When big meat
lobbying firms have former FDA and USDA employees on their side, or
employees of these lobbying firms are appointed to positions within the
FDA and USDA, they have an advantage in lobbying Congress to implement laws that are favorable to the meat industry to which they are so closely connected.23 With industry interests, rather than that of the consumer, in
20. “Big Food” generally refers to large, national or multi-national fast food chains
like McDonald’s, Wendy’s, Chick-fil-a, as well as the companies that supply them like Kraft
and Coca-Cola. See Jeremy Rogers, Note, Living On The Fat Of The Land: How To Have
Your Burger And Sue It Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, n.17 (2003).
21. MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY UNDERMINES
OUR HEALTH AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK xvi (2006).
22. See Close the Revolving Door Act of 2015, S. 1959, 114th Cong. (2015).
23. See, e.g., Revolving Door: Search Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture, supra note 18.
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mind, the effect of the revolving door has led to increased meat contamination throughout the United States, resulting in severe public sickness and
death.24

I.

MEAT CONTAMINATION AND ITS EFFECTS

Meat contamination is a serious and painful public dilemma. E. coli is
particularly dangerous because it resists high temperatures—it can grow in
conditions up to 111 degrees Fahrenheit—and can be unaffected by antibiotics.25 Moreover, e. coli is often challenging to medically treat because it
contains a toxic gene that destroys the red blood cells of the inhabitant.26
Alex Donley, a kindergartener exposed to e. coli, suffered horribly before
he died: the bacteria liquefied parts of his brain and shut down nearly all of
his organs.27
Shockingly, FDA inspections have drastically decreased over the last
few decades.28 This has resulted in an increase in deadly diseases like e. coli
and salmonella.29 In 1972, the FDA conducted about 50,000 food safety
inspections.30 Yet, in 2006, the FDA conducted only 9,164 safety inspections, less than 20% of the number of inspections in 1972.31 With the average American eating over 200 pounds of meat products each year, food
safety inspections are essential in protecting the health and wellness of
Americans.32 With such heavy consumption of meat, pathogenic inspections should increase, not decrease.33
The effects in the decline of inspections are disturbing, resulting in
significantly more serious outbreaks of e. coli and salmonella infections.34
24. See, e.g., O’Hagan, supra note 8. Additionally, it is difficult to ascertain a specific percentage of increased outbreaks from the Center for Disease Control’s 1999 figures
to its 2011 estimate, as the methods in which the CDC obtained statistical data in 1999 were
different from that in 2011. Data and Methodological Differences, 2011 and 1999, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/differences-inestimates.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2014).
25. MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: THE POLITICS OF FOOD SAFETY, 41 (2nd ed.,
2010).
26. Id.
27. Bob Herbert, In America; Let Them Eat Poison, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/03/opinion/in-america-let-them-eat-poison.html.
28. FOOD, INC. (Magnolia Pictures 2009).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Mark Bittman, Rethinking the Meat Guzzler, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/weekinreview/27bittman.html?_r=0.
33. FOOD, INC., supra note 28.
34. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducts estimates and trends
of food borne illnesses and outbreaks every five to ten years. The data and methodology
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In 2007 alone, 73,000 people suffered from e. coli illnesses.35 In 1995,
when little Alex Donley died, that number was 20,000.36 The Center for
Disease Control and Prevention estimated salmonella caused over 1 million
illnesses and nearly 400 deaths in 2011.37 The FDA estimates that food contamination overall affects 48 million people annually, and results in 3,000
deaths.38
In 1995, in response to the Jack-in-the-Box e. coli outbreak, at a congressional hearing regarding food safety, Representative Patrick Kennedy
of Massachusetts aptly noted that the American people should not have to
question the safety of their food:
When contaminated food inadvertently reaches the
public, these agencies have the power they need to
protect the public health. The basic food safety
standards were enacted into law many years ago.
Today, they are relied on and taken for granted by
the American public. That is absolutely how it
should be. No one has to give a second thought to
the safety of the food that they eat today—and they
should not have to start to worry about it tomorrow
. . . I wonder where the call is across the country
for people that say our food is too safe?39
Up until the implementation of the more reliable Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) standards in 1998, meat products, prior to
reaching the consumer, underwent what was unofficially called the “poke,
scratch, and sniff” inspection test.40 This was the process that remained
analyzed from the 1999 sample is different from the 2011 sample, making direct trend analysis over the years challenging. For more information, see Data and Methodological Differences, 2011 and 1999, supra note 24 and Trends in Foodborne Illness in the United States,
CTR.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
(May
8,
2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/trends-in-foodborne-illness.html.
35. Questions & Answers: Sickness caused by E. coli, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION (Dec. 10, 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/qa_ecoli_sickness.htm.
36. Herbert, supra note 27.
37. CDC 2011 Estimates: Findings, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.html.
38. William Tootle, What’s New In The FDA’s 2015 Budget?, FDA VOICE (Mar. 7,
2014),
http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/03/whats-new-in-the-fdas-2015budget/; see Hylton, supra note 1, in which scientists estimate that for every one reported
case, twenty-eight remain unreported.
39. 141 CONG. REC. S10269 (daily ed. July 19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
40. Stevenson Swanson, Scratch, Sniff No Longer Rule For Safe Food, CHI. TRIB.
(Dec.
1,
1998),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-1201/news/9812010094_1_spending-on-food-safety-meat-and-poultry-poultry-plants.
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unchanged since the turn of the 20th century.41 After the e. coli and salmonella outbreaks in the early 1990s, HACCP was finally implemented, and a
more scientific approach was taken to detect meat contamination.42 But
HACCP does not prevent all contaminated meat from reaching the consumer, as the prevalence of outbreaks in recent years clearly demonstrates.43
Moreover, federal regulations permit certain levels of micro-bacteria like
salmonella to be present in food, and eventually passed on to the consumer,
without issuing a warning or recommending a recall.44
The price the American people are paying is not just with their health.
Economic Research Service, an agency within the USDA, reported that the
cost to society, just in regards to the pathogen e. coli, was over $271 million
in 2013, and estimates that it costs an additional $200,000 to investigate
each outbreak.45 These figures do not include the cost of other pathogen
outbreaks such as salmonella.46 That is a tremendous amount of money
gushing out of the American economy and taxpayer supported government,
especially when agencies like the FDA and USDA are currently charged
with prevention of pathogen outbreaks.
In 1998, the USDA implemented microbial testing for salmonella and
e. coli 0157h7 to better determine if a shut down of the meat processing
plant should be recommended if that plant repeatedly failed to meet acceptable test results.47 However, despite this governmental public safety
action, the FDA and USDA do not have the authority to issue a mandatory
recall of food once it is in the marketplace, or to shutdown a meat processing plant.48 After being sued by the meat and poultry associations,49 the
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Multistate Outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O26
Infections Linked to Chipotle Mexican Grill Restaurants, supra note 6.
44. Hylton, supra note 1; see also James Andrews, Salmonella on Chicken: Is Zero
Tolerance
Feasible?,
FOOD
SAFETY
NEWS
(Feb.
5,
2014),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/02/is-zero-tolerance-on-salmonellafeasible/#.VoSDPITZqf4.
45. Cost of Food Borne Illnesses, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
(Oct.
7, 2014),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/cost-estimates-of-foodborneillnesses.aspx#48448; see also NESTLE, supra note 25, at 39.
46. Id. These figures only include medical expenses, such as cost of doctor or hospital visits, and do not factor in additional losses incurred from being unable to return to work
or tangential costs to the economy.
47. Marion Burros, New U.S. Standards for Meat Are Snared in a Court Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/04/us/new-us-standards-for-meatare-snared-in-a-court-fight.html. The microbial testing referred here is HACCP. Swanson,
supra note 40.
48. The agencies can recall other non-consumer products, and the only item the
FDA has the authority to recall in regards to a food product is baby formula. For more information on the debate around mandatory recall, see Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall

2016]

WHAT’S REALLY AT STEAK

105

USDA cannot close the plant.50 Whether or not a food product is recalled is
entirely voluntary by the private food processing company, despite the safety or quality of the product.51
Instead of stricter inspections and compulsory authority to recall contaminated and diseased food, why have the food safety regulations loosened
and governmental oversight weakened? The decrease of inspections and
subsequent increase in contaminated meat over the last decade is a direct
result of the conflict of interests between meat lobbyists and the very agencies created to protect the American people from diseased meat.
Meat safety has become a polarizing, political issue with public consumers on one end and the meat industry on the other.52 The purpose of
prohibiting conflicts of interest is to ensure that government agencies, like
the FDA and USDA, are acting with the best interest of the public in mind,
rather than fulfilling private industry agendas.
What happens when these organizations have strong ties to meat lobbyists who push for regulations that favor the meat industry over the consumer?53 Conflicts of interest create a potential inability for a person to
remain impartial when he or she has considerable ties to an industry that
has served him or her professionally.54

Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Approach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 563 (2004).
49. See, e.g., Supreme Beef v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
50. Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. USDA,
415 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005); Ensuring Meat Safety: The HACCP System, FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/evaluating/ensuring.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2016); Burros, supra note 47.
51. FSIS
Food
Recalls,
USDA
(Oct.
16,
2015),
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/foodsafety-fact-sheets/production-and-inspection/fsis-food-recalls/fsis-food-recalls.
52. See generally Steve Kay, 3 Major Beef Industry Issues – Demand, Quality,
Transparency, BEEF (Jan. 22, 2015), http://beefmagazine.com/blog/3-major-beef-industryissues-demand-quality-transparency.
53. Lobbying, in general, is not a bad thing. Lobbyists oftentimes have useful scientific data that can assist government agencies in crafting reasonable laws and regulations. As
Maye points out, the ability to address our government is protected by the First Amendment.
I argue, however, that meat industry lobbyists have strong influences over governmental
agencies that are self-serving to their particular interests and this is negatively affecting
American citizens as a whole. See Maye, supra note 18.
54. Close the Revolving Door Act of 2015, S. 1959, 114th Cong. (2015).
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REGULATORY BACKGROUND

Meat, poultry, and seafood products are regulated by two main agencies, the FDA and USDA.55 The FSIS, overseen by the USDA, is responsible for ensuring meat and poultry products are safe for public consumption,
and inter alia, properly labeled and packaged.56
The USDA was established in 1862, and primarily oversees meat and
poultry products.57 Its importance regarding meat consumption was more
widely recognized through Upton Sinclair’s fictitious account in The Jungle, which aptly reflected the horrors of diseased meat consumption at the
turn of the 20th century.58 The influence lobbyists have on USDA regulation is long-standing and substantial: “When meat producers complain
about policies that appear unfavorable to their interests, government officials listen . . . . [M]eat producers make little attempt to hide their lobbying
activities, and their motives are transparent and readily documented.”59
Furthermore, the USDA reports its findings to congressional agricultural
committees, which are comprised of members from agriculturally dependent states.60 One source even boldly commented, “official recommendations
of the USDA are determined by the commercial interests of agribusiness.”61
As a parallel to the USDA, the FDA was created in 1906 to ensure
public safety protection for particular items that make their way into the
American market.62 The FDA oversees regulations in regards to drugs, cer55. The division of what agency regulates what type of food is complex and confusing, and riddled with inefficiencies that are not the focus of this Comment. See Hylton, supra
note 1.
56. About FSIS, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Nov.
24, 2015), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/informational/aboutfsis/about-us.
57. Alexandra Tarrant, How Far Has Food Safety Come in 150 years?, USDA
BLOG (May 3, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2012/05/03/how-far-has-food-safetycome-in-150-years.
58. Id.; see also Roger Roots, Other Rising Legal Issues: A Muckraker's Aftermath:
The Jungle Of Meat-Packing Regulation After A Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413
(2001).
59. Nestle, supra note 25, at 65.
60. See id. at 64 (“90% of the members of the Senate agricultural committee came
from states in which at least 20% of the entire labor force was employed in food production.” Two years later, the Jack in Box outbreak happened).
61. Richard Jacoby & Raquel Baldelomar, The FDA’s Phony Nutrition Science:
How Big Food and Agriculture Trumps Real Science—And Why The Government Allows It,
SALON
(Apr.
12,
2015,
9:30
AM),
http://www.salon.com/2015/04/12/the_fdas_phony_nutrition_science_how_big_food_and_a
griculture_trumps_real_science_and_why_the_government_allows_it/.
62. When and Why Was the FDA Formed?, FDA (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm214403.htm;
MEASURING
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND EXPERTISE ON FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEES, E. RES. GROUP,
INC. (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/ergcoireport.pdf.
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tain eggs, seafood, grains, milk, fruit, and vegetables.63 The FDA is comprised of fifty-one committees made up of scientific experts in the field,
who are non-voting representatives, and typically hold appointed positions
for four years.64 Because committee members are non-voting, they can be
exempt from the conflict-of-interest standards, and receive waivers.65 The
FDA requires disclosures of financial conflicts of interest, but this does not
ultimately prevent a person who may benefit financially from serving on
the committee.66 Essentially, the FDA mandates disclosure of professional
conflicts of interest, but does not necessarily bar someone from employment by the FDA or sitting on a committee.
In 2015, the annual operating budget was $4.5 billion dollars, which
reflected an increase of $143.5 million from the previous year.67 This included a $27.5 million increase specifically for the Food Safety Initiative,
which supports “rulemaking and guidance development, industry technical
63. What
Does
the
FDA
Do?,
FDA
(Dec.
3,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194877.htm; see Hylton, supra
note 1, which sums up the complicated structure of how these agencies regulate what particular food:
In theory, the line between these two should be simple: the
F.S.I.S. inspects meat and poultry; the F.D.A. covers everything else. In practice, that line is hopelessly blurred. Fish are
the province of the F.D.A.—except catfish, which falls under
the F.S.I.S. Frozen cheese pizza is regulated by the F.D.A., but
frozen pizza with slices of pepperoni is monitored by the
F.S.I.S. Bagel dogs are F.D.A.; corn dogs, F.S.I.S. The skin of
a link sausage is F.D.A., but the meat inside is F.S.I.S.
Id.
Also, the Government Accounting Office is aware of shortcomings in regards to food safety;
in 2014 it released a report arguing for a single food agency to coordinate management and
oversight for all thirteen agencies that deal with food safety. See Marion Nestle, GAO:
USDA and FDA Need To Coordinate Food Safety Activities, FOOD POLITICS BLOG (Dec. 22,
2014),
http://www.foodpolitics.com/2014/12/gao-usda-and-fda-need-to-coordinate-foodsafety-activities/.
64. Advisory
Committee
Industry
Representatives,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/industry.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
65. Id.; MEASURING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND EXPERTISE ON FDA ADVISORY
COMMITTEES, supra note 62. In 2007, the FDA hired ERG to assess conflicts of interests
within the organization. The ERG held that it was possible to find experts within a particular
field that did not have a conflict of interest, but this was improbable: “Alternative candidates
might exist” and the “ability to create a conflict-free panel is speculative.”
66. MEASURING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND EXPERTISE ON FDA ADVISORY
COMMITTEES, supra note 62, at 1-4. The financial interest, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1),
must not be so “substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services
which the Government may expect from such officer or employee,” but even this has exceptions. See 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2).
67. Food and Drug Administration FY 2015 Operative Plan Narrative, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/U
CM433147.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
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assistance, and increased data gathering and analytical capacity to support
risk-based priority setting and resource allocation.”68 Other monies contribute to the implementation of the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA),
which aims to provide “preventive controls for human and animal food,
produce safety, and foreign supplier verification.”69 To put context to these
figures, there has been a steady increase in funding to the FDA. In 2010, the
operating budget was $3.2 billion, which was a 19% increase from 2009,
and at the time, the largest amount of money the FDA had ever received. 70
In 2013, the agency received $3.9 billion.71
An increase in budget appropriations specifically for additional consumer protection and safety implementation could be, in part, a reaction to
outbreaks over the last several years.

III.

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THERE IS AN OUTBREAK

When a person becomes ill from meat contamination, a shut down of
the restaurant where the consumer last ate, or the farm from which the meat
originated, is not immediate, and it can take months for consumers to be
notified of an outbreak.72 Reasonably, it takes time to trace the contaminated meat from the sickened person to the source. “F.S.I.S. typically must
find a genetic match between the salmonella in a victim’s body and the
salmonella in a package of meat that is still in the victim’s possession, with
its label still attached.”73 This means that plants are still producing meat that
is contaminated, despite people becoming hospitalized, and FSIS is slow to
recommend a shut down.74 Once an outbreak is identified, FSIS can only
issue a recommendation.75 The agency can use roundabout pressure tactics
68. Id. For a comprehensive overview of the FDA budget, see also Budget, FDA
(Apr.
7,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/default.htm.
69. Food and Drug Administrative FY 2015 Operative Plan Narrative, supra note
72.
70. Summary of the FDA's FY 2010 Budget, FDA (May 22, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/ucm153154.
htm.
71. Food and Drug Administration FY 2014 Operative Plan Narrative, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/U
CM388299.pdf.
72. Hylton, supra note 1 (“By the time Schiller became infected by salmonella,
federal officials had been tracking an especially potent outbreak of the Heidelberg variety
for three months—it had sent nearly forty per cent of its victims to the hospital.”).
73. Id.
74. Id. See also Timeline for Reporting E. coli 0157 Infection, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/reportingtimeline.html.
75. FSIS Food Recalls, supra note 51; NESTLE, supra note 25, at 104.
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like posting on their website that a particular farm, packing plant, or restaurant is contaminated as a means to effectuate a voluntary closure.76 However, such a tactic is only effective if the public is made aware of the outbreak.
The time-consuming and slow investigations of meat contamination
lead to more widespread outbreaks, as showed by the dozens of closures in
Chipotle Restaurants across the United States in 2015.77 The executive
branch must be granted stronger enforcement powers and increased staff to
investigate and prosecute violations of the laws and regulations. While it is
important to make sure that the source of the contamination is correctly
linked to the particular meat plant or restaurant, the system for sourcing
contaminated meat and closures needs to be reevaluated to better protect the
public.
Additionally, salmonella is not considered adulterated, under the
USDA definition.78 This means that meat that contains certain strains of
salmonella can be sold, and federal law allows a certain level of this pathogen to be present before it is considered hazardous.79 By implementing
clearer definitions that do not allow the beef or poultry industry to wiggle
out of a technicality, the consumer will be more protected when contamination does occur.80

IV. WHY HAVE OUTBREAKS OF E. COLI AND SALMONELLA
INCREASED WHEN WE HAVE TWO REGULATING AUTHORITIES TO
PREVENT THIS?
There are many reasons that could be attributable to an increase in
pathogenic outbreaks. While the FDA has received a steady increase in
funding, it may not be allocated to directly preventing contamination. Inefficiencies between how the FDA, USDA, and FSIS operate also serve as an

76. Hylton, supra note 1.
77. See, e.g., Multistate Outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O26
Infections Linked to Chipotle Mexican Grill Restaurants, supra note 6.
78. Dana Dovey, USDA Sued Over Sale Of Drug-Resistant Salmonella In Meat,
Due To Loophole Allowing Contamination, CONSUMER NEWS (May 29, 2014, 11:10 AM),
http://www.medicaldaily.com/usda-sued-over-sale-drug-resistant-salmonella-meat-dueloophole-allowing-contamination-285196.
79. See also Supreme Beef v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001) in which the
company was successful in arguing that salmonella was not an adulterant because it was
“naturally occurring.”
80. After the national panic caused by the e. coli outbreak in 1993, FSIS successfully labeled the bacterium an adulterant, so it is more strictly regulated than salmonella. See
Hylton, supra note 1.
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impediment to slaughterhouse-to-consumer safety.81 However, the most
glaring explanation is the culture of non-enforcement by the FDA and
USDA, and the prevalence of conflicts of interests within these agencies.
Conflicts of interests within food regulatory agencies like the FDA and
USDA lead government officials to advocate for laws that favor and protect
the interests of the food industries.82 When these agencies favor big meat
companies over the consumer by not preventing meat contamination, pathogenic outbreaks increase.83
A.

WHO IS IN CONFLICT?

Decision-makers both in Congress and the executive branch are divided into categories of hierarchy. There are “principal officers,” followed by
“inferior officers,” and at the bottom, “employees of the United States.”84
These classifications of position are integral to precluding who may or may
not partake in lobbying activities post-government employment.85
One conflict exists between the elected government officials who are
dependent upon political contributions and the lobbyists representing
wealthy meat industry companies. Meat lobbyists contribute heavily to politicians, ensuring that through political campaign donations, their interests
are kept in the forefront of the law making process.86 There are different
actors on the lobbying stage: congresspersons leave the government sector
to become lobbyists, and former lobbyists move into executive agency positions, thereby creating an ever-changing flux of people moving in and out
of government positions to fulfill private agendas.87 Studies have indicated
81. “The current structure is there not because it’s what serves the consumer best . .
.” (quoting Elisabeth Hagan, former head of FSIS) Hylton, supra note 1.
82. Revolving Door: Search Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture,
supra note 15.
83. SIMON, supra note 21.
84. KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 73-81 (Thomson West,
2008). “Employees of the United States” are often referred to as “mere employees.”
85. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1962).
86. For example, Tyson Foods, the world’s largest meat producer, contributed more
than $17 million to campaign financing, between 1989 and 2014. See Food Processing &
Sales, INFLUENCE EXPLORER, http://influenceexplorer.com/industry/food-processingsales/93b0e1ce2e904638a93eb9bbcd0bb7f8 (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). Moreover, lobbying firms saw a significant revenue increase 2015. Catherine Ho, Lobby Firms Reap Benefits
of
an
Active
Congress,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
21,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/01/21/lobby-firms-reapbenefits-of-an-active-congress/.
87. Jeffrey Lazarus, Which Members of Congress Become Lobbyists? The Ones
With The Most Power. Here’s the Data, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/15/which-members-ofcongress-become-lobbyists-the-ones-with-the-most-power-heres-the-data/ (“The ‘revolving
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that the trend from government to lobbying has generally increased since
the 1970s.88
American Meat Institute,89 a trade association that represents the interests of the meat industry, including meat packers and slaughterhouses,
raised and spent the largest monetary amounts during election years, and
contributed directly to politicians and their campaigns.90 Moreover, many
meat companies are represented by powerful lobbying firms, like the National Meat Association and the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association,
who likewise support political campaigns favorable to their client’s interests.91
In 2004, the Consumer Federation of America released a report analyzing the relationship between individuals and organizations within the
meat industry that financially support politicians. The report focuses on
contributions made by particular individuals during President George W.
Bush’s campaign and subsequent election, and were later appointed to food
safety committees.92 The report postulates that the conflict of interest led to
an increase in micro-bacteria outbreaks.93
But it is not just money, in the form of contributions to politicians,
which demonstrates clear conflicts of interest.94 A second conflict also exdoor’ that brings lobbyists and high-level government officials into each other’s line of work
is a huge and growing part of Washington.”). The author is undertaking a study on the revolving door, which includes an analysis of lobbying activity of former members of Congress from 1976-2012. See Lazarus, infra note 88.
88. Id.; see also Jeffrey Lazarus, Amy McKay & Lindsey Herbel, Who Walks
Through The Revolving Door? Examining The Lobbying Activity Of Former Members Of
Congress, INTEREST GROUPS & ADVOCACY (Mar. 2016), http://www.palgravejournals.com/iga/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/iga201516a.html.
89. As of 2015, the company is now known as North American Meat Institute.
About Us, NORTH AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, https://www.meatinstitute.org (last visited
May 18, 2016).
90. American Meat Institute: Contributions to Federal Candidates 2008 Cycle,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgot.php?cycle=2008&cmte=C00024281 (last visited
Mar. 17, 2016).
91. Steve Johnson, The Politics of Meat, FRONTLINE (April 18, 2002),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/politics. Date confirmed by Frontline,
with author.
92. Carol Tucker Former, et al., “Not Ready-to-Eat”: How the Meat and Poultry
Industry Weakened Efforts to Reduce Listeria Food-Poisoning, THE CONSUMER FED’N OF
AM. (Dec. 2004), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/97-013F/97-013F-6.pdf. The
report specifically focuses on listeria, but similar conclusions can be drawn to additional
outbreaks of other bacteria, like e. coli and salmonella.
93. Id.
94. Known as “food governmentenomics,” this conflict of interest is the “concept
that describes the economic and public health effects resulting from agribusiness and food
lobby influences on government agencies, such as the FDA and USDA, and federal advisory
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ists between people who sit on committees of the FDA and USDA while
maintaining connections to the meat industry, or former and current employees in the meat industry who presently now hold influential government positions.95
OpenSecrets, a resource site that gathers information about lobbying
firms, political contributions, and conflicts of interest, lists 180 people who
are part of the “revolving door,” meaning they have a conflict of interest
ties with the USDA.96 Not everyone on this list should be precluded from
holding a government position. In fact, expertise held by some of these individuals in specified areas assists the FDA and USDA in making informed,
science-backed decisions. However, there needs to be a process by which
individuals with potential conflicts of interests are evaluated on a case by
case basis to determine if the personal interests supersede the nation’s interests.97
Perhaps the most obvious, and most often cited, poster child for the
revolving door syndrome is Michael Taylor.98 Taylor began his career as a
lawyer for the FDA, before working at a firm that represented Monsanto in
the late 1970s. He returned to the FDA when he was appointed as the Deputy Commissioner in 1991.99 After he worked for the USDA in the mid1990s, Taylor went back to representing the interests of Monsanto.100 He reentered government employment as the Senior Advisor to the FDA Commissioner, and has served there since 2009.101 Taylor himself acknowledged
the “cozy relationship” between the government in charge of regulating the
meat industry and the meat industry itself.102 He has been critical of these
conflicts of interest; when he walked into his new office at the USDA, he
committees to change their priorities of interest from private industry to consumer protection.” Steier, infra note 233, at n.5.
95. Revolving Door: Search Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture,
supra note 15.
96. Id. But see David Zaring, Against Being Against The Revolving Door, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 507 (2013) (which argues that the revolving door and its negative impacts is
largely overstated).
97. See Anand, infra note 150.
98. Marion Nestle, Michael Taylor Appointed to FDA: A Good Choice!, FOOD
POLITICS BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://www.foodpolitics.com/2009/07/michael-taylorappointed-to-fda-a-good-choice/.
99. Id.
100. Why Is A Former Monsanto Vice President Running the FDA?, INVESTMENT
WATCH BLOG (Jan. 7, 2015), http://investmentwatchblog.com/why-is-a-former-monsantovice-president-running-the-fda-michael-r-taylor-was-was-promoted-to-commissioner-of-thefda-after-spending-years-lobbying-for-the-gmo-foods-giant-the-position-affords-taylo/.
101. Meet Michael R. Taylor, J.D., Deputy Commissioner for Foods and Veterinary
Medicine,
FDA
(July
7,
2014),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/ucm196721.htm.
102. Johnson, supra note 91.
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said, “[o]n the telephone there were two speed dials with names by them.
And one was to the American Meat Institute and the other was to the National Cattlemen’s Association.”103 This shows the extent to which the government is in the pockets of these meat-lobbying firms.
While no other person quite personifies the concept of the revolving
door as Taylor, there are many other people who still swing through the
door between private companies with specific interests and then hold a
governmental position, or vice versa.104 James Fitzgerald, a former beef
lobbyist, was appointed by President Bush as the Chief of Staff at the
USDA.105 Bush appointed another lobbyist; prior to becoming head of the
FDA, Lester Crawford was Vice President of the National Food Processors
Association.106 Crawford currently works for lobbying firm Policy Directions, Inc.107 Deborah Atwood was the Vice President of the American
Meat Institute (AMI) from 1992-95, worked at the National Pork Producers
Council in the late 1990s, and then joined the USDA in the early 2000s.108
Dale Moore, former Executive Director for Legislature Affairs at the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, was appointed as the Chief of Staff to
the Secretary of the USDA.109 Moore is now the Executive Director for the
American Farm Bureau Federation.110
These are potential conflicts of interest because the individual employee often works at the appointment of the current administration.111 When
there is a change of administration, or his term is completed or not renewed,
he may seek a return to employment back in the private sector.112
103. Id.
104. Not everyone agrees that Taylor’s conflict of interest is necessarily a bad thing;
in 2015, he spoke at STOP Foodborne Illness fundraising event; Revolving Door: Search
Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture, supra note 18.
105. FOOD, INC., supra note 28; James (Jim) Fitzgerald, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/james-jim-fitzgerald/5a/632/175 (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
106. FOOD, INC., supra note 28.
107. Lester
M.
Crawford,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/rev_summary.php?id=37263 (last visited Mar. 17,
2016).
108. Deborah
M.
Atwood
Employment
Timeline,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/rev_summary.php?id=16015 (last visited Mar. 17,
2016).
109. Dale Moore Named Chief of Staff to Secretary Veneman, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
(Feb.
13,
2001),
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2001/02/00
26.html. It is important to note that federal agencies have not labeled these people as “experts” as defined by the Office of Government Ethics. See Anand, infra note 150.
110. Dale Moore, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/dale-moore-60976a13
(last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
111. The
Executive
Branch,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/executive-branch (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
112. Lazarus, supra note 88.
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Understandably, agencies like the FDA and USDA need to be staffed
with people knowledgeable of the meat industry, including farming, processing, and production.113 If this were not the case, it would be like staffing a hospital board of directors with people lacking medical training and
experience. The objection to conflicts of interests between those who run
the FDA and USDA and their particular ties to the industries they regulate
arises when the conflict impacts the American consumer negatively. The
rise in meat contamination and subsequent illnesses correlates with a decrease in federal inspections, demonstrating that these conflicts of interest
are in direct opposition to the health of the American people.114
With government officials in the pockets of lobbyists, the American
people are impacted dramatically, especially when we place trust in such
officials to safely monitor the foods that are raised, processed, sold, and
consumed.115 As Michele Simon, a public health lawyer focusing on industry food regulation, pointed out,
When government gives corporations public platforms and forms partnerships with them, this conveniently places industry right where it wants to
be: in the position of telling the federal government
how to make policy while getting the stamp of approval from agency officials. . . . That’s when government has essentially abdicated its responsibility
to protect its citizens.116
Meat industry lobbyists are not the only ones who have been accused
of serious disregard for meat safety. Politicians with strong ties to meat
production and packaging plants utilize their political influences to favor
the food industries, over the safety of the public consumer.117 In 1995, Representative James T. Walsh of New York proposed a legislative rider,
known as “The Walsh Rider,” that would loosen restrictions on e. coli and
salmonella testing.118 The amendment ultimately tried to prohibit the use of
funds for more scientific-based meat inspections, unnecessarily requiring
the USDA to form a separate committee.119 The rider, drafted by Walsh and
an attorney who works for the National Meat Association, was unsurpris113. See Anand, infra note 150.
114. O’Hagan, supra note 8; Multistate Outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O26 Infections Linked to Chipotle Mexican Grill Restaurants, supra note 6.
115. See, e.g., O’Hagan, supra note 8.
116. SIMON, supra note 21, at 164.
117. See NESTLE, supra note 25, at 65.
118. 141 CONG. REC. H7307 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Walsh).
119. Id.
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ingly, supported by the meat industry.120 Walsh ultimately withdrew the
amendment once he reached an agreement with the Secretary of the Agriculture Department.121 Even though the rider was never passed, Walsh was
criticized as using the amendment as a tactic to delay meat inspections.122
Part of the compromise reached was that plants will do periodic bacterial
inspections themselves, but government inspectors will test for salmonella
throughout the various stages of the meatpacking process.123
Interestingly, Walsh’s connection with the meat industry did not end
with his partnership with the National Meat Association lawyer.124 In 1996,
the year after he proposed his amendment in favor of the meat industry, he
accepted $65,000 in political contributions from meat-supported organizations.125 He also had ties to the American Meat Institute, which contributed
to his re-election campaign in 2000.126 American Meat Institute contributed
again to Rep. Walsh’s re-election in 2002.127
One of the biggest blows that affected the ability of the USDA to regulate meatpacking plants was the result of litigation in Supreme Beef Processors Inc. v. USDA.128 In 2001, the USDA attempted to shut down a beef
processing plant after it repeatedly tested positive for salmonella. The federal court determined that the USDA can only regulate “adulterated” meat,
and it only has the authority to prevent the meat from being labeled as in-

120. Dan Morgan, Industry Finds A Way Around Budget Cutters, WASH. POST (June
26, 1995), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/26/industry-finds-away-around-budget-cutters/ff605843-4532-4e95-ad08-88bb590b3e6f/.
121. 141 CONG. REC. H7307, supra note 123. Walsh agreed to the adoption of the
HACCP-based inspection system, standing for “Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point.”
122. See Johnson, supra note 91; Spoiled Meat, Rotten Congress, MOTHER JONES
BLOG (Sept. 12, 1995, 3:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1995/09/spoiledmeat-rotten-congress.
123. Upgrading the Safety of Meat, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/09/opinion/upgrading-the-safety-of-meat.html.
124. Morgan, supra note 120.
125. See Johnson, supra note 91; another source reports that the Federal Election
Committee says he has received $66,000 from 1988-1995; see Spoiled Meat, Rotten Congress, supra note 122.
126. OpenSecret.org makes it clearer where the money came from: “The organizations themselves did not donate, rather the money came from the organizations’ PACs, their
individual members or employees or owners, and those individuals’ immediate families.”
James T. Walsh Top 20 Contributors 1999-2000,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/contrib.php?cycle=2000&cid=N00001261
(last
visited Apr. 25, 2016).
127. James T. Walsh Top 20 Contributors 2001-2002, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/contrib.php?cycle=2002&type=I&cid=N00001261
&newMem=N&recs=20.
128. Supreme Beef v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
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spected, and ultimately, from going to market.129 USDA does not have the
power to shut down the entire plant.130 While the case was on appeal, big
poultry company Tyson Foods bought the meat-processing plant IBP,
“forming a Goliath in market share and political power.”131 According to
Carol Tucker Foreman, director of the Food Policy Institute at Consumer
Federation of America,132 senators who voted against the legislation setting
salmonella limits were tied to the meat industry.133
Politicians and meat lobbyists are not the only ones with unclean
hands; the USDA has been slow to allow privatized industrial testing for
micro-bacteria. In 2004, Creekstone Farms in Kansas sued the USDA when
it was prevented from testing at a facility the farm had built and designed
specifically to see if mad cow disease existed in their cattle.134 Surprisingly,
the government agency refused to administer the testing kits necessary to
determine if the disease was present in the cattle.135 While the farm wanted
to test every cow for the disease, the USDA argued that this process undermined its own policy of randomized testing.136 Moreover, if every cow were
to be tested for the disease, the price of beef would increase.137 The USDA,
with the interest of the meat industry in mind, argued that mad cow disease
is relatively rare and the agency’s policy of testing roughly 1% of cattle is

129. 21 U.S.C. § 608 (2012) (“[W]here the sanitary conditions of any such establishment are such that the meat or meat food products are rendered adulterated, he shall
refuse to allow said meat or meat food products to be labeled, marked, stamped or tagged as
‘inspected and passed.’”).
130. FSIS Sets New Procedures for Plants That Fail Salmonella Tests, FSIS,
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/fsis-content/internet/main/topics/food-safetyeducation/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/production-and-inspection/fsis-sets-newprocedures-for-plants-that-fail-salmonella-tests/fsis-sets-new-salmonella-procedures
(last
updated Aug. 12, 2013). However, the USDA is not completely without power. While the
USDA cannot actually close a plant, it can withdraw its inspectors, which effectively prohibits the plant from operating; see NESTLE, supra note 25, at 104.
131. See Johnson, supra note 91.
132. Carol
Tucker
Foreman,
SOURCEWATCH,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Carol_Tucker_Foreman (last visited Mar. 21,
2016).
133. See Johnson, supra note 91.
134. Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC, v. Dep’t of Agric., 539 F.3d 492 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); ConsumeristCarey, USDA To Meatpackers: You Have No Right To Test For
Deadly Diseases, CONSUMERIST (May 31, 2007), http://consumerist.com/2007/05/31/usdato-meatpackers-you-have-no-right-to-test-for-deadly-diseases/.
135. ConsumeristCarey, supra note 134.
136. Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, 539 F.3d 492 (the USDA has the authority to
control the sales of the kits that test for mad cow disease).
137. Marc Kaufmann, Company’s Mad Cow Tests Blocked; USDA Fears Other
Firms’ Meat Would Appear Unsafe, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15855-2004Apr15_2.html.
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sufficient.138 Ultimately, the USDA prevailed, and the court concluded that
the agency had the authority to regulate treatment of animals, which included the post-mortem testing Creekstone wanted to conduct.139
While legislators obviously operate separately from executive agencies
like the FDA and USDA, the connection between government officials in
both branches and the food industry is significant, especially when these
legislators depend on financial contributions.140 Since conflicts of interest
exist within the walls of Congress, the need for even tighter restrictions and
regulations within the FDA and USDA is vital.
B.

GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT AT PREVENTING CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST AND WHY IT’S NOT WORKING141

The checks-and-balances system mandated by the Constitution ensures
no one branch is more powerful than another, and, by effect, helps inhibit
conflicts of interest. While the president holds the power to appoint senior
officials, this power is limited and must be approved by the “Advice and
Consent of the Senate.”142 Congress’s lawmaking power is subject to a
presidential veto.143 This provides some accountability in Congress.
In the executive branch, there are advisory agencies that supervise
regulatory agencies.144 The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) was
designed to oversee committees that are comprised within the FDA and
USDA.145 However, the FACA does not have provisions that deal with individual member’s conflicts of interest.146 That job falls to other laws which
regulate specific agencies and the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). The
purpose of FACA is to “promote the objectivity of advisory committee deliberations.”147 FACA does acknowledge that conflicts exists, but shrugs off
responsibility: “To avoid potential conflicts, each advisory committee
member should assure that he or she receives adequate information from
138. Matt Apuzzo, Court: US Can Block Mad Cow Testing, WASH. POST (Aug. 29,
2008,
1:42
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/29/AR2007032901795.html.
139. Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC, 539 F.3d 492.
140. James T. Walsh Top 20 Contributors 1999-2000, supra note 126.
141. See Nestle, supra note 98 (Michael Taylor, for example, was able to bypass
conflict of interest laws because he never violated the one-year limit).
142. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
144. U.S. Government Accountability Office, infra note 199.
145. The Federal Advisory Committee Act, U.S. GEN. SERVICE ADMIN. (Dec. 24,
2015), http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/100916; Federal Advisory Committee Act, 92 Pub.
L. 463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
146. FACA: Conflicts of Interest and Vaccine Development, Statement of James L.
Dean, Dir. (June 15, 2000), http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101004.
147. FACA: Conflicts of Interest and Vaccine Development, supra note 146.
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the sponsoring agency and completes any required appointment papers and
disclosure forms prior to service on a committee.”148
One provision provides that “the advice and recommendations will not
be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special
interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory committee’s independent judgment.”149 That may be fitting, but the very nature of an advisory committee poses a potential problem: these committees are comprised of
industry experts directly tied to a field in which they have colleagues and
well-known experience. The American public is left to trust that the experts
and regulators have disclosed their personal financial interests and any professional conflicts of interest as they are legally defined, and also must trust
that they remain objective in reaching the committee’s goals.150
One way of getting around a conflict of interest is assigning a committee member the title of “expert.” This loophole allows former meat lobbyists to serve on the FDA and USDA because they have specialized
knowledge of the meat industry, and it is presumed that they are also familiar with meat safety.
However, designating someone as an expert is also not without some
regulation. The Office of Government Ethics has been critical of experts
serving on advisory committees, and has tightened restrictions on when an
agency can grant a waiver.151 The OGE requires seven elements when determining if an expert is needed.152 This consists, in part, of the uniqueness
of a particular expert’s knowledge and qualifications, the difficulty in locating similar experts who do not have a conflict of interest, and prior FDA
experience.153 While this is critical in ensuring conflicts of interests are kept
at bay, OGE lacks the power of enforcement and does not have a system in
place for recourse when a violation occurs.154
148. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Brochure, U.S. GEN. SERVICE
ADMIN. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101010.
149. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 92 Pub. L. 463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
150. FACA: Conflicts of Interest and Vaccine Development, supra note 146; see
Saurabh Anand, Using Numerical Statutory Interpretation to Improve Conflict of Interest
Waiver Procedures At The FDA, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2010), in which the author proposes a “numerical statutory interpretation” to resolve the issue of experts tied to a particular
industry who also utilized by federal agencies.
151. See Anand, supra note 150, at 652, 660.
152. See id.
153. Memorandum from Marilyn L. Glynn, General Counsel, Office of Gov’t Ethics,
to Designated Agency Ethics Officials (Aug. 18, 2005) (on file with the Office of Government
Ethics),
https://www.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/All+Advisories/04E39F5397ED0F7E85257E96005FB
D36/$FILE/05x4_.pdf?open. See Anand, supra note 150.
154. The OGE was created to prevent conflicts of interests, as opposed to investigating violations. Nevertheless, when there are ethical violations, or suspected violations, these
are referred to the Department of Justice. The Reauthorization of the Office of Government
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To oversee ethical concerns, the FDA has also taken steps to monitor
and administer conflicts of interest. The Office of Management administers
the FDA Ethics and Integrity program to “ensure that all FDA employees
are free from conflicts of interest and do not hold prohibited interests.”155
The Ethics and Integrity agenda is closely entwined with the OGE.156

V.
A.

WHAT LAWS CURRENTLY EXIST AND HOW THEY ARE NOT
WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

18 U.S.C. § 208

Conflicts of interest are criminalized and prosecuted under United
States Code Title 18, which focuses primarily on employees in the executive branch.157 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 208 prohibits an employee in the
executive branch from participating on a committee in which he or an immediate family member has a financial interest.158 However, there are exceptions to this law; if the interest of the member’s service outweighs the
“potential for a conflict of interest,” the law does not apply.159 This waiver
and exception rule allows conflicts of interest, as long as they are acknowledged.160 Moreover, the conflict of interest only applies within a twelvemonth period, a relatively short period of time.161
B.

18 U.S.C. § 207(a)

Post-employment restrictions of government employees who leave
public service for private industry are addressed under 18 U.S.C. § 207.162
The length of time covering the restrictions of non-involvement chiefly
depends on whether the employee was a highly ranked official (as measured by pay grade) and how much the person participated in the activity (by
Ethics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Fed. Workforce and Agency Org., 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Marilynn Glynn, Office of Government Ethics).
155. 2012
Budget
Summary,
FDA
(Mar.
6,
2014),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/ucm291553.
htm.
156. United States Office of Government Ethics, infra note 232.
157. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 207-209.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1994).
159. Id.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1) (1962); § 208(d)(2).
161. Colleen O. Davis, Note, Red Tape Tightrope: Regulating Financial Conflicts of
Interest in FDA Advisory Committees, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591 (2014), in which the author suggests that the FDA regulates itself more heavily than Congress, and waivers are
rarely granted by the FDA.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2014).
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official involvement) that is the inquiry for a potential conflict.163 The ban
ranges from one to two years, up to a possible lifetime restriction.164
Enacted in 1962,165 this statute appears to already prohibit someone
from the FDA or USDA from lobbying, as it states:
Any person who is an officer or employee . . . of
the executive branch of the United States . . . who,
after the termination of his or her service . . . knowingly makes, with the intent to influence, any
communication to or appearance before any officer
or employee of any department . . . in connection
with a particular matter . . . in which the person
participated personally and substantially as such
officer or employee.166
The FDA gives an example of a government employee approving a
grant application and then “switching sides” after leaving her position with
the government.167 Under the statute, the FDA advises that this person can
advise on how to “adhere to government procedures . . . [but] may not . . .
sign any documents directed back to the agency.”168
C.

LOOPHOLES IN 18 U.S.C. § 207

18 U.S.C. § 207 falls short for three main reasons. First, while the
statute aims to prevent employees who served in the executive branch from
future positions that would be of a conflict of interest, the law does not prohibit former lobbyists from holding a position within the executive
branch.169 This is why people like Dale Moore and Deborah Atwood170 can
work for companies like the National Cattlemen’s Association and American Meat Institute and not be in violation of federal law when they later
hold high-level positions within the USDA.171 Section 207 only applies to
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2014). Close the Revolving Door Act seeks to change this to
“Any person who is a Senator, a member of the House of Representative, or an elected officer of the Senate or the House of Representatives.”
167. Digest Of Criminal Statutes Related To Ethics, FDA (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WorkingatFDA/Ethics/ucm071740.htm.
168. Id. See also Office of General Counsel Ethics Division, Summary of PostEmployment
Restrictions
(Oct.
2011),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/WorkingatFDA/Ethics/UCM125319.pdf.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2014).
170. Deborah M. Atwood Employment Timeline, supra note 108.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2014).
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former government employees, and not to potential governmental employees or appointees that had prior conflicts of interest.172
Secondly, the lifetime ban is extreme and serves only to promote
“stealth lobbying,” in which lobbyists are disguised and hidden through
loopholes.173 Because of this extreme ban and ability to circumvent the intention of the law, these disguised lobbyists do not have an incentive to
register as lobbyists. Also, due to the lack of enforcement of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act, these stealth lobbyists are not in danger of suffering any
significant consequences.174
Moreover, if an organization, whether it is a registered lobbyist or not,
can demonstrate that it is providing the executive agency with information
“solely for the purpose of furnishing scientific or technological information,” then there is not a § 207 violation.175 Agencies like the FDA and
USDA rely on experts to give them factual information so that they can
make a prudent and informed decision to protect the consumer. This communication is abused when the relationship between the communicator
(such as Deborah Atwood),176 who once was a high-level employee within
a lobbying firm, now represents an agency that may have interests in opposition to those of her former employer.177
Thirdly, ambiguous terms create room for interpretation by the judicial
branch and therefore abuse. The term “officer or employee” does not clarify
whether this provision applies to members who sit on executive committees
such as the FDA and USDA.178 While case law has brought certain clarity
to these terms, “[t]he line between ‘mere’ employees and inferior officers is
anything but bright.”179 Moreover, it is not always reasonable to define every particular term in statutes; the flexibility and adaptability of terms, if
applied in good faith, can still be implemented as they were originally intended, without having to be reevaluated by Congress.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2014).
173. William Luneburg, Symposium, The Law of Lobbying: Anonymity and Its Dubious Relevance to the Constitutionality of Lobbying Disclosure Legislation, 19 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 69, n.109 (2008);
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 549 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
174. Id.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 207(j)(5) (2014).
176. Deborah M. Atwood Employment Timeline, supra note 108.
177. See Allen B. Coe, 18 U.S.C. § 207(A)(1) “Lifetime Representation Ban” Opinions: A Lifetime’s Work for Agency Ethics Officials and Advisors, 63 A.F. L. REV. 129
(2009).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2014); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause states that there are two kinds of officers: “principals” and “superiors” are
nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, whereas Congress can vest appointment in others if they are “inferior officers.”
179. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging the
Supreme Court’s difficulty in defining “officer”).
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Of course, § 207 is in place to prevent conflicts of interests, but in reality merely restricts a person from participating “personally and substantially,” which are terms that remain undefined.180 This is one reason why
there are several officials on advisory committees for the FDA and USDA
who are not in violation of § 207. Furthermore, “intent to influence” is not
defined within the statute, and the lack of case law has not established its
meaning.181
Additionally, the absence of Supreme Court authority interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 207 serves only to enhance the statute’s abuse.182 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted § 207(a) to “disqualif[y] only
[those people] from particular cases where Congress could rationally make
the judgment that participation would be evil as a result of an individual’s
previous activity as a government employee in the same matter.”183 “Evil”
is a subjective word that cannot reasonably serve as the standard for violating the statute. A conflict of interest can have a negative effect, as we have
seen within the FDA and USDA, without necessarily being “evil.”
Reexamining § 207 and better outlining the actions of current and
former members of executive agencies will decrease the potential for conflicts of interests, and further ensure that the interests of the American public are served.
D.

LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995184

The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) was designed to tighten restrictions between lobbyists and the government.185 “[E]xisting lobbying
disclosure statutes have been ineffective because of unclear statutory language, weak administrative and enforcement provisions, and an absence of
clear guidance . . . .”186 The Act was in response to loopholes identified

180. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1), which prohibits former and current members who hold,
or have held, positions within the executive or legislative branches from “knowingly making, with the intent to influence, any communication . . . on behalf of another person . . . .”
181. Randall E. Ravitz & Nicholas Sanservino, Federal Criminal Conflict of Interest,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 709 (1998); Allen B. Coe, 18 U.S.C. § 207(A)(1) “Lifetime Representation Ban” Opinions: A Lifetime’s Work For Agency Ethics Officials And Advisors, 63 A.F.
L. REV. 129 (2009).
182. The Court has reviewed two cases regarding this statute, one in 1946 and other
almost forty years later in 1984, both of which do not pertain to the subject matter in this
article. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482
(1984).
183. United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1973).
184. 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (1996).
185. Id..
186. 2 U.S.C. § 1601(2) (1996).
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within the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946.187 With the LDA of
1995, companies who previously were not required to register now had to
do so under new clarified definitions.188
While commendable, the Act is not as effective as it should be, as
demonstrated by the relationship between lobbying entities and the FDA
and USDA, subsequent regulations that favor the meat industry, and continuous outbreaks of contaminated meat.189 Noticeably, the Lobbying Disclosure Act does not place a ban on lobbying, but merely requires disclosure if the government employee acted as a lobbyist within a two-year period.190 As author Kathryn Plemmons pointed out in her article on lobbying
activities, “The lack of judicial interpretation of the Act, coupled with criticism that the law merely asks lobbying organizations to engage in selfpolicing of their own activities, has [led to] the opinion that the LDA’s effectiveness [is unknown and] still remains to be seen.”191
One of the major failures of the LDA is the built-in ambiguity. Despite
pledging to reduce loopholes from the previous Act of 1946, the LDA
leaves wiggle room for lobbyists to continue to have a relationship with
government contacts. LDA defines lobbyist as “any individual who is employed . . . by a client for financial or other compensation for services that
include more than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose
lobbying activities constitute less than 20% of the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that client over a six month period.”192
So, as long as someone spends less than 20% of his time and less than
$20,000 in a six-month period on lobbying activities, he does not have to
register as a lobbyist.193
187. One criticism of the Act of 1946 was that it did not specifically define “lobbyist.” Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, 79 Pub. L. No. 601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
“Lobbyist” was clarified with the enactment of the LDA, supra note 184. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 only applied to the legislative branch.
188. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1603 (2007); Kathryn L. Plemmons,
“Lobbying Activities” and Presidential Pardons: Will Legislators' Efforts to Amend the LDA
Lead to Increasingly Hard-Lined Jurisprudence?, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 131, 137 (2003).
189. O’Hagan, supra note 8.
190. 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (4)(b)(6) (2007). LDA, perhaps obviously, requires disclosure
whereas 18 U.S.C. § 207 places restrictions on lobbying with the “intent to influence.”
191. See Plemmons, supra note 188, at 142.
192. Lobbyist is defined as
any individual who is employed or retained by a client for financial or other compensation for services that include more
than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that client
over a six month period.
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 104 Pub. L. No. 65, 109 Stat. 695 (1995).
193. 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(ii), amended by 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2008).
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Another criticism of the LDA is the lack of significant enforcement
power.194 For example, violation of the Act includes a fine up to $200,000,
which is hardly a deterrent punishment for lobbying firms earning tens of
millions of dollars annually. Moreover, a relatively small number of people
have ever been charged with a violation, making the risk of prosecution
unlikely. Furthermore, the majority of suits filed for violations have resulted in quiet unpublicized settlements.195
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) handles violations for
failure to disclose conflicts of interest.196 Considering the number of people
using the revolving door,197 the GAO surprisingly settled only three violations between 1995 and 2008.198 Lack of enforcement can be due to a shortage of personnel. There are simply not enough people employed to enforce
violations. The United States Attorney’s Office, the sole office with the
authority to charge a lobbyist or lobbying entity with a United States Code
violation, employed only seven people nationwide to handle such violations
as of 2014.199
Recognizing that mere disclosure of lobbying activities is not enough,
and that the Lobbying Disclosure Act does not solve the problem of conflicts of interest, 18 U.S.C. § 207 aims to ban lobbying from certain officials dependent upon their role with the government.200
E.

THE HONEST LEADERSHIP AND OPEN GOVERNMENT ACT
OF 2007201

The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act supplemented the
LDA by requiring lobbyists to disclose financial contributions quarterly, as

194. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, n.36 (2007). Note that the Honest
Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 amended increased the LDA’s originally fine
of $50,000 to $200,000. See 2 U.S.C. § 1606 (2007).
195. William V. Luneburg, The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where
We Are Now and Where We Should Be Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85, 123 (2009), relying on Kenneth P. Doyle, Justice Department Reveals First Cases Settled Under Lobbying
Disclosure Statute, 157 BNA, INC. DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A-18.
196. About
GAO,
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.,
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
197. Revolving Door: Search Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture,
supra note 18.
198. See Luneburg, supra note 195, at n.224, relying on U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with New Disclosure
Requirements GAO-08-1099, 18 (Sept. 2008).
199. U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO 15-310 (2015).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2014).
201. 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (1996).
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opposed to twice a year.202 It prohibits former senators from lobbying for
two years since the end of their service, and former Representatives are
prohibited from lobbying for one year.203 This amended provision does not
really solve the problem, as it simply encouraged “stealth lobbying” and
discouraged people from becoming registered lobbyists.204 But again, the
Open Government Act provides greater transparency to the legislative process, and not the executive process, which fails to include organizations like
the FDA and USDA.
F.

CLOSE THE REVOLVING DOOR ACT OF 2015205

The Close the Revolving Door Act of 2015 (CRDA) offers the most
hope in closing the gap between conflicts of interest among politicians and
the meat industry, and attempts to take the politics out of the public’s expectation for safe meat consumption. The CRDA seeks to amend sections
of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, and small portions of 18 U.S.C. §
207.206
Proposed in 2010 by Senator Michael Bennet of Colorado, CRDA has
never made it past the Senate.207 Bennet has continued to introduce the bill
each year; most recently it was reintroduced in August 2015 and is in session at time of publication.208 If the Act does not pass this year, this Comment urges Senator Bennet to reintroduce it with significant changes. With
the suggested changes (discussed later in Section VI) to include executive
agencies that govern meat regulation, and cutting down on conflicts of interest, this Act could have a significant effect on reducing meat contamination.

202. Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying Regulations in
State Legislatures, 40 URB. LAW. 375 (2008), proposing that the “Act’s primary focus is on
the financial relationship between the Legislative Branch and outside influences. It amends
existing law to strengthen oversight of lobbyist activity and to reach the major funders of
lobbying and advocacy.”
203. 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (1996).
204. Luneburg, supra note 173; Michael Hiltzik, The Revolving Door Spins Faster:
Ex-Congressmen Become ‘Stealth Lobbyists’, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015, 9:51 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-revolving-door-20150106column.html.
205. As of February 2016, currently in legislation; Close the Revolving Door Act of
2015, S. 1959, 114th Cong. (2015).
206. Close the Revolving Door Act of 2010, S. 3272, 111th Cong. § 5 (2010). The
bill was referred to the Senate committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and was never passed.
207. Id.
208. The bill was first introduced in 2006 by Representative Peter DeFazio, then
again by Senator Bennett in 2010, 2014, and 2015.
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The Close the Revolving Door Act proposes a lifetime ban on any
former member of Congress from lobbying.209 Currently the ban is two
years for former Senators and one year for former Representatives.210 Specifically, the bill calls for a lifetime ban on a member of Congress from
becoming a lobbyist, or a former lobbyist from holding a government position, something author Dennis Thompson encouraged twenty years ago.211
Because § 207(a) does not define “personally and substantially,” this
ambiguity leaves room for lobbyists to take advantage of this loophole.212
To close this potential for abuse, the Close the Revolving Door Act attempts to define “substantial lobbying contact” by looking at the whole
picture.213 Such factors to determine substantial contact include, whether or
not those contacts were involved in any current legislation or if those contacts were related to some sort of governmental funding. 214 However, reluctant to draw a firm line, it includes the provision: “Simple social contacts
with the Member or committee of either House of Congress and staff, shall
not by themselves constitute substantial lobbying contacts.”215
CRDA also seeks to change all one-year bans to six years. If this provision passes, executive branch personnel are forbidden, for six years, from
contacting government personnel who work in the same department that
they did.216
It similarly prohibits a former lobbyist from working in Congress
within six years of being a registered lobbyist, which is a step in ensuring
that personal interests do not affect legislation or regulatory authorities.217
The Close the Revolving Door Act also amends a section to the LDA,
which tightens financial reporting by registered lobbyists.218 Specifically, a
“substantial lobbying entity”219 must report an individual who has provided
paid consulting work to the lobbying firm. This individual must have been a
209.
210.
211.

Close the Revolving Door Act of 2015.
18 U.S.C. § 207(e)(1).
Dennis F. Thompson, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO
INSTITUTIONAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION, 59 (1995), “The surest way to sustain a
sharp division between legislating and lobbying would be to prohibit former members from
ever engaging in lobbying. . . . It is not unreasonable to ask public officials, as part of their
public service, to give up some opportunities that other citizens enjoy.”
212. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(B).
213. Close the Revolving Door Act of 2015.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Close the Revolving Door of 2015, S. 1959, 114th Cong. (2015); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 207.
217. Close the Revolving Door Act of 2010, 111 S. 3272 § 5(b) (2010).
218. Id.
219. Defined as an “incorporated entity that employs more than 3 registered lobbyists
during a filing period.” Close the Revolving Door Act of 2010, S. 3272, 111th Cong. § 6(e)
(2010).
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former Senator or member of the House, an official who was paid more
than $100,000 in a single year, worked in the legislative branch for less
than four years, or held a highly ranked position.220

VI. THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CLOSE THE
REVOLVING DOOR ACT ON CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS: PROPOSED
CHANGES
A.

THE ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES AND MEMBERS

If passed by Congress, the Close the Revolving Door Act would begin
an effective advancement toward protection of the public food safety regulations. What is needed is a provision that serves the executive branch,
much like Title 18, but closes loopholes and further restricts conflicts of
interest.
The Close the Revolving Door Act largely focuses on the legislative
branch,221 and chiefly ignores the abuse that occurs in the executive committees, like in the FDA and USDA. In order to be effective in protecting
consumers from meat contamination, the CRDA needs to be amended to
include regulatory agencies and fill in the gaps that exist in Title 18.
I propose that in addition to the mandatory disclosures outlined in the
LDA, the Close the Revolving Door Act should be expanded in the following ways.
First, it needs to include executive branch employees; second, implement stricter fines for violations; and third, implement a larger regulatory
authority that currently exists within the Government Accounting Office.
B.

INCREASING THE BAN FROM SIX TO TEN YEARS

The FDA and USDA rely on experts in the meat industry to inform
them of particularities to which they are unaware.222 However, as we have
seen, this reliance has been abused, and results in looser regulations on
food, thereby sickening the American public.223 By implementing a longer
ban between the length of time a former lobbyist can serve on a government
agency, the chances of conflicting interests decreases. By preventing former
lobbyists from serving on agencies like the FDA and USDA, which will
220. Highly ranked position specifically means “chief of staff” “legislative director”
“counsel” “press secretary,” Close Revolving Door Act of 2010.
221. Close the Revolving Door Act of 2010, S. 3272, 111th Cong. § 5 (2010).
222. See Anand, supra note 150.
223. See, e.g., Multistate Outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O26
Infections Linked to Chipotle Mexican Grill Restaurants, supra note 6.
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effectively close the revolving door, the American people can be assured
that these agencies have their best interests in mind, rather than those of the
meat industry to which they have professional ties.224
C.

LESS AMBIGUOUS TERMINOLOGY

The analysis used to define “substantial lobbying contact” outlined in
the Close the Revolving Door Act should be expanded to include executive
branch employees under 18 U.S.C. § 207.225
Furthermore, “personally and substantially” also should be defined and
given parameters. The statute states that any “officer or employee” of the
executive branch is permanently prohibited from participating in matters in
which he or she “participated personally and substantially as such officer or
employee.”226 The vague meaning of this term of art has led to abuse within
the FDA and USDA. The CRDA needs to include particular factors used to
determine what it means to participate “personally and substantially.” Factors to be considered could be depth and degree of involvement of the individual’s past employment within a lobbying firm, the level of command of
the position at the government agency, whether or not the individual has
executive authority to enforce particular agency regulations, and management powers associated with the individual’s position.

VII.

A MORE PRODUCTIVE AND EXPANSIVE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

There are several departments in place that monitor and enforce conflicts of interests, but many are inadequate. While the GAO is tasked with
overseeing violations in regards to financial disclosures, it is understaffed
and lacks consistent enforcement.227 The Office of Government Ethics
(OGE) is also tasked with preventing conflicts of interest, specifically within the executive branch.228 Following OGE, each agency like the FDA and
USDA must have a Designated Agency Ethics Official, who oversees the

224. Moreover, the Close the Revolving Door’s proposed lifetime ban on senators
from lobbying may just encourage “stealth lobbying.” Luneburg, supra note 173.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2014).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 207(b)(2) (2014).
227. See Luneburg, supra note 195.
228. About
OGE,
U.S.
OFF.
OF
GOV’T
ETHICS,
https://www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/About%20OGE?openview (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
The OGE also created General Standards of Ethical Conduct for Executive Branch Employees (General Standards) which outlines standards of conduct.
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conduct of agency employees.229 The OGE releases advisory opinions each
year with the goal of preventing ethical violations.230
While these checks-and-balances for ethical concerns are meant to resolve conflict of interest issues, the GAO and OGE are lacking in efficiency
and effectiveness, especially in light of those individuals using the revolving door.231 In 2014, the OGE held eleven people accountable for criminal
conflict of interest violations, but not a single person from the FDA or
USDA was prosecuted for a violation.232

VIII. CONCLUSION
Too many conflicts of interests are interwoven between regulatory
agencies like the FDA and USDA and the private meat, poultry, and seafood processing industries.233
While federal law and ethic committees aim at precluding conflicts of
interests, current laws are not effective in preventing or resolving the prevalence of these conflicts of interests within the FDA and USDA. Conflicts of
interests between individuals serving on executive agencies designed to
protect the consumer, and their relationship to lobbying organizations, has
led to weakened enforcement of regulations and a more ineffective FDA
and USDA.234 An obvious consequence of this is the heightened instances
of meat contamination, resulting in an unacceptable number of illnesses and
fatalities. While American meat regulation has made considerable strides
over the last hundred years, the recent rise of pathogenic illnesses requires
immediate change in policies and the agencies regulating the industry. Ex229. Ethics
and
Integrity
Staff
Contact
Information,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WorkingatFDA/Ethics/ucm071641.htm (last visited Mar.
21, 2016).
230. Grant Dawson, Conflict Of Interest: Working Guidelines For Successive Conflicts Of Interest Involving Government and Private Employment, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
329 (1998).
231. See, e.g., Lester M. Crawford, supra note 107.
232. Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., United States Government of Ethics, to Designated
Agency
Ethics
Officials
(July
27,
2015),
https://www2.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/All+Advisories/1C3D07B39FDE132B85257EC3003C
C34A/$FILE/LA-15-10.pdf?open (on file with the Office of Government Ethics).
233. Revolving Door: Search Results, Agency search: Department of Agriculture,
supra note 18. Conflicts of interests between government agencies and private companies is
not new; the FDA and USDA rely on data developed by scientists employed by Big Food
companies like Pepsi and Kraft; Gabriela Steier, Dead People Don't Eat: Food Governmentenomics and Conflicts-of-Interest in the USDA and FDA, 7 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L.
(2012).
234. Political financial contributions to influential congressional members from
interested industries further erodes the barriers to public health and safety. See Spoiled Meat,
Rotten Congress, supra note 122.
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panded scientific research is further needed to identify, isolate, and eradicate newer strains of food-borne illnesses to combat resistant pathogenic
bacteria.
By implementing the proposed changes to the Close the Revolving
Door Act, in addition to closing loopholes in 18 U.S.C. § 207, conflicts of
interests will decrease and the interests of the consumer will be placed
where they belong—at the forefront.

